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PREFACE
Scene: Board room of CyberConglomerate, a large Japanese
technology firm.
Time: Late evening.
Setting: On one side of the table sit the directors of
CyberConglomerate. On the other side, sits the CEO of
a small California start-up company with his two VPs
(i.e., the whole company). Discussions have been
proceeding toward a deal whereby CyberConglomerate
will license the start-up company's new software package.
Dialogue:
CYBERCONGLOMERATE PRESIDENT: We are pleased with the
progress shown to date on the latest release of the software. We look
forward to a beta test version once we have signed the documents.
START-UP COMPANY CEO: According to the documents we have
drawn up, we will complete the modifications by the end of this
quarter and begin shipping to you by the beginning of next quarter.
CYBERCONGLOMERATE PRESIDENT: Excellent. In light of that,
the only thing left is to sign the contract. I will now sign.
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[He uses his smart card' to apply his digital signature to the documents and
then passes them to the start-up CEO. Afew seconds pass while the documents
travel across the Internet.]
START-UP COMPANY CEO: Received. I will sign also.
[He brings up his digital signature software on his palmtop, inserts his smart
card, logs in using his biometric fingerprint reader, and also digitally signs the
document.]
CYBERCONGLOMERATE PRESIDENT: That is all for now. Speak
with you soon.
START-UP COMPANY CEO: Good day.
Epilogue: The two parties both reset their teleconference
video walls, and in the Japanese office the direc-
tors go home for the evening. In the U.S. office,
the start-up company goes to work.
This story depicts much more science than fiction. The technologi-
cal capability that exists today would make this type of transaction a
reality. The legal effect of such a transaction, however, would be
dubious at best.
INTRODUCTION
For more than a decade, the legal community has sought to address
the ubiquitous subjects of electronic commerce ("EC") and electronic
data interchange ("ED") at the international level.2 During this
time, the growth of open communications systems and EC has
exploded.' Consequently, the gap between the outer reaches of law
1. See Linda Kay Sakelaris, Manufacturers Report Standards Will Drive Smart Card Marke
RADIO COMM. REP., Sept. 16, 1996, at 50, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (stating
that smart card looks like credit card except that instead of having a magnetic strip encoded
with the credit card number, a smart card contains a small electronic chip that can hold
information).
2. See GA Res. 40/71, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., 112th plen. mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/40/71 (1986) (calling"upon Governments and international organizations to take action
... so as to ensure legal security in the context of the widest possible use of automated data
processing in international trade" (citing Report of the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law,
18th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 70-72, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985))).
3. Estimates vary widely on the size of the Internet, the primary forum for electronic
commerce. One recent assessment stated that the Internet is doubling in size every three
months. SeeJack Egan, Ready, Set, Search: Powerful Search Engines Dig Out What You Seek, U.S.
NEWs & WORLD REP., Apr. 29, 1996, at 64. Another study, conducted by Nielsen Media
Research, indicated that the total number of Internet users ranges anywhere from 16 million
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and the needs of the commercial community have widened. The
law's ability to respond to changes in technology, most notably the
Internet, remains in doubt. For a number of reasons, several of
which this Essay will explore, progress has been slow in the alignment
of international law with technology.
Part I of this Essay assesses recent activity and advances in public
key cryptography and one potential application to international EC
and EDI. Part I then examines the revolution in information security
created by an area of mathematics known as public key cryptography
and provides a short primer on cryptography leading into a discussion
of digital signatures. Part II discusses the general areas of EC and
EDI. Part III examines the existing systems of international business
transactions, focusing particularly on the challenges that must be
addressed to facilitate electronic transactions. In Part IV, a review of
recent efforts provides insight into what should occur next. Finally,
Part V suggests the specific mechanism of digital signatures as a
catalyst for stimulating harmonization in international EC and EDI.
I. SECURITY SERVICES, PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY,
AND DIGITAL SIGNATURES
An overview of the fundamental services provided by an informa-
tion security system serves as the best introduction to public key
cryptography in general and digital signatures in particular.' By
focusing first on these essential services, a more thorough understand-
ing of the interface between the security concepts involving cryptogra-
phy and the underlying legal framework will result.
to 20 million. See Peter H. Lewis, In a Recount, Cyber Census Still Confounds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
1996, at D1. Size notwithstanding, a recent study estimated that approximately $189 billion of
business in goods and services will be transacted by the year 2000. SeeJonathan Gaw, Expectations
Lowered for Internet Commerce, STAR TRIB., May 1, 1996, at ID.
4. "Cryptography" is the use of codes, ciphers, algorithms, and other devices that scramble
the content of electronically-sent messages so that only certain people can interpret and view
the message. SeeA. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and
the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 709, 713 (1995).
"Public key cryptography" is a practice begun in 1974 in which users employ two keys, one
public and one private. See id. at 890. Messages encrypted with one key can be decrypted only
with the other. See id at 891. A "key" is a value used to encrypt messages by use of algorithms.
See BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY: PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS, AND SOURCE CODE IN
C 3 (2d ed. 1996).
"Digital signatures" allow for authentification of messages by identifying the sender and
connecting the sender to the message. SeeFroomkin, supra, at 895. If the message attached to
the digital signature is altered in any way, the signature will not decrypt the message properly.
See id.
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In the situations described below, the author of a message (who is
also described as the sender) composes the message5 and transmits
it to the receiver. In practice, this transmission likely would occur
over an open communications system in which security and legal
concerns would be significant.6 The threat posed by unauthorized
messages exists whenever a message travels over an information system
accessible to outsiders.7 Any such message can be vulnerable to
misuse, unauthorized intervention, and manipulation.8 Thus, for
both legal and technical reasons, the sender would apply various
mechanisms prior to sending the message to implement the following
security services.
A. Security Services
The first security service, known as confidentiality,9 assures both
sender and receiver that the message could not have been understood
by any unauthorized parties. If an eavesdropper were able to
intercept the message, confidentiality theoretically renders it
impossible for the interloper to interpret the message properly. The
information security mechanism of encryption commonly provides this
service.' Encryption mathematically scrambles the communication
so that only the sender and recipient can unscramble and understand
the original message." It is important to note that the service of
confidentiality is not provided via digital signature mechanisms.1
The second security service, known as integrity, assures the recipient
that the message from the sender arrived intact. Unlike confidentiali-
5. Note that the term "message" applies to any type of communication between two
parties, whether text-based or otherwise. For example, a schematic of a printed circuit board
being transmitted by a sender to a recipient would constitute a message.
6. See Froomkin, supra note 4, at 720 (describing ease with which electronic mail can be
forged and noting vulnerability of banks to electronic theft of funds).
7. See id. at 722-25 (noting, for example, that as use of mobile communications such as
cellular phones and inadequately protected computer networks increase, so do chances for
exposure to high- and low-tech industrial espionage).
8. See Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia Krauthouse, Electronic Commerce: New Paradigms in
Information Law, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 937, 945 (1995).
9. Another common term for confidentiality is privacy.
10. Encryption, the application of cryptography, is the process of disguising a message so
as to hide its substance. See SCHNEIER, supra note 4, at 1.
11. More accurately, the only people who can interpret and understand the original
message properly are those in possession of the key to the algorithm used to encrypt the
message. See Froomkin, supra note 4, at 886.
12. See SCHNEIER, supra note 4, at 37 (explaining that digital signature algorithms do not
encrypt). Although digital signatures will assure the recipient that the message received actually
was sent by the named sender, they cannot guard against others viewing the message. See id. at
41 (citing, as example, use of digital signatures with seismic data exchanged between United
States and Soviet Union to assure each nation that other is not tampering with outgoing data).
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ty, this service does not thwart eavesdroppers. 3 An eavesdropper
still could alter a message transmitted with only an integrity mecha-
nism. The integrity mechanism, however, will alert the recipient of
such an alteration.'4 Numerous methods exist that provide integrity,
including checksums, hash functions, and error-correcting codes. 15
Unbeknownst to most individuals, each of these integrity mechanisms
likely affects their daily routine by providing improved communica-
tions.
16
The third security service, known as authentication, assures the
recipient that only the sender could have created the message.' In
many respects, authentication is the most easily understood of the
security services described here. The concept of authentication fits
well with the existing paradigm of a paper-based signature. 8 It
assures the recipient of the authenticity of the sender's message. 9
From a legal perspective, authentication is perhaps the most
important of all of the security services. The ability to prove one's
identity over vast distances, and to do so without ever having met the
other party, significantly increases the viability of widespread
international EC and EDI.° No longer are face-to-face meetings
required for the signing of documents." Although the ceremonial
13. Eavesdroppers commonly are referred to as adversaries, attackers, interceptors,
interlopers, intruders, opponents, or "the enemy." See id. at 4.
14. See Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems & the Group of Computer Experts
of the Central Banks of the Group of Ten Countries, Security of Electronic Money, at 29, Annex 1,
Glossary (Aug. 1996) (visited Jan. 8, 1997) <http://www.systemics.com/docs/papers/
BISsmart.security.html> (on file with The American University Law Review) (defining integrity as
"the quality of being protected against accidental or fraudulent alteration or of indicating
whether or not alteration has occurred").
15. SeeSCHNEIER, supra note 4, at 30 (describing hash function as "a function, mathematical
or otherwise, that takes a variable-length input string ... and converts it to a fixed-length
(generally smaller) output string"). Hash functions and other integrity mechanisms are useful
for "fingerprinting" files to allow for easy verification. See id. at 31.
16. For example, data transmission equipment such as modems and fax machines employ
integrity mechanisms to detect and correct errors. See FRED HALSALL, DATA COMMUNICATIONS,
COMPUTER NETWORKS AND OPEN SYSTEMS 125-37 (4th ed. 1996) (providing detailed discussion
of error detection methods, including parity, checksums, and cyclic redundancy checks).
17. SeeSCHNEIER, supra note 4, at 52 (explaining that authentication device allows recipient
to verify that sender is not impersonating someone else). For example, the use of a password
prior to conducting electronic banking at an automated teller machine is a process of
authentication. See id.
18. See id. at 3-36. The paradigm holds that paper-based signatures are valuable because
the signature is unforgeable, authentic, not reusable, unalterable, and cannot be repudiated.
See id.
19. See Froomkin, supra note 4, at 895 ("If the cipher is strong and the key tightly guarded,
the use of the correct cipher strongly suggests that the message was sent by the person it
purports to be from.").
20. See id. at 895 n.798 (noting that digital signatures in conjunction with private keys can
be used to authenticate electronic messages and sender's identity).
21. See id. at 895 & n.798; SCHNEIER, supra note 4, at 38-39 (describing use of digital
signatures and public key cryptography to sign legal documents).
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aspect of "signing" a document will continue to exist, the method by
which this function occurs will shift from paper to electronic.
Nonrepudiation, the fourth security service, although technological-
ly similar to authentication, provides a different type of security. It
assures the recipient that the author of a message cannot, at a later
time, deny having transmitted the message to the recipient.2 2 The
concept of nonrepudiation, which has evolved from the information
security field, can cause confusion because there is no such thing in
the legal vernacular as nonrepudiation. Further adding to the
confusion is the contract law concept of repudiation.23 Repudiation
occurs when one party reverses its earlier affirmative decision to enter
into a contract. That is, the party repudiates the contract. Because
a party always can try to breach a contract, there really is no legal
notion of nonrepudiation. In information security, however, the
concept of nonrepudiation is well established.
B. What Is Public Key Cryptography?
Cryptographic discussions extensively use the word "key."24 The
term evolved from the analogy of a physical key used to lock and
unlock something. In cryptography, the key metaphor relates to the
locking and unlocking of data. A cryptographic key enables a user to
transform data according to some prescribed algorithm.25 The key
itself has no recognizable form; it is simply a particular arrangement
of information to be used by a cryptographic algorithm. A key, when
represented as readable characters, might look something like this:
h7$*RlnJ&85#{3Bw.
Two more common terms are "encryption" and "decryption," which
apply to the processes of scrambling and unscrambling data using a
cryptographic key and a prescribed algorithm. The encryption
process renders the original data, or "plain text,"26 unreadable,
22. See Charles I. Merrill, An Attorney's Roadmap to the Digital Signature Guidelines, in DOING
BusiNEss ON THE INTERNET 379,383 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. 64-3988, 1996).
23. SeeJOHN D. CALAMARI &JOSPEH M. PERILLO, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 12-4 (3d ed.
1987) (defining repudiation as: (1) positive statement indicating promisor cannot or will not
perform; (2) transfer to third party of interest in anything essential for performance; or (3)
voluntary affirmative act rendering performance impossible).
24. See supra note 4 (explaining use of electronic key in cryptography).
25. In modem cryptography, only the key, and not the algorithm itself, must be concealed
to protect the security of the message. See Froomkin, supra note 4, at 886. Encryptions using
multiple keys usually need only keep one key secret. See id. at 886 n.768.
26. "Plain text" refers to data that has not been "locked" or encrypted by the cryptographic
key. Plain text, for example, might be a document or an e-mall message in readable form.
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whereas the decryption process (the reverse of the encryption
process) manipulates the "cipher text"27 to restore the original data.
Public key cryptography" owes its existence to a branch of
mathematics known as computational number theory29 and involves
various techniques such as modular reduction, 0 discrete loga-
rithms,"' factoring of large prime numbers, and, most importantly,
one-way functions. A one-way function furnishes security by providing
a relatively easy computation in one direction, but an extremely
difficult computing problem when the original computation is
reversed. 2 Effectively, it is impossible to reverse the first computa-
tion with the computing power available today. A detailed discussion
of these concepts goes beyond the scope of this Essay, but several
good references exist.33
Prior to the introduction of public key cryptograph), in the
1970s,l encryption technology was highly specialized." In contrast
to public key techniques, the earlier systems used an approach known
as secret key cryptography.36 This approach (still in use today)
requires that all users have the identical key in order to communicate
27. "Cipher text" refers to information that has undergone the cryptographic transforma-
tion that "locks" the data. Once plain text has been converted to cipher text, it is no longer
readable.
28. See supra note 4 (defining public key cryptography). Typically, encryption is done by
the public key, and decryption is performed by the private key. See SCHNEIER, supra note 4, at
89. Almost anyone, therefore, can encrypt a message, but only those with access to the private
key can decrypt it. Id.
29. See SCHNEIER, supra note 4, at 198 (detailing computational number theory).
80. See id. at 242.
81. See id. at 261-63 (discussing significance of discrete logarithms in finite group to
cryptography).
32. This is referred to as a trap-door, one-way function. See id. at 30. An effective metaphor
for understanding this phenomenon is the process of taking a watch apart and then attempting
to reassemble it: disassembling the watch is simple, but putting it back together is extremely
difficult without instructions. See id,
33. See generally id. (providing thorough overview of entire field of cryptography, from high-
level conceptual information to low-level coding). For a detailed and highly-theoretical
discussion of the underlying mathematical concepts on which public key cryptography is based,
see 2 DONALD E. KNtUTH, THE ART OF COMPUTER PROGRAMMING, SEMINUMERIcAL ALGORITHMS
(2d ed. 1981). Other excellent sources of information about these concepts include Froomkin,
supra note 4; and Visa, Tomorrow: Electronic Commerce (visited Sept. 18, 1996)
<http://www.visa.com/cgi-bin/vee/sf/standard.html> (on file with The American University Law
Review) (discussing Secured Electronic Transaction ("SET") standard adopted to safeguard credit
card purchases made over open networks).
34. See generally Whitfield Diffie & Martin Helhnan, New Directions in Cryptography, 22 IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION 6 (1976); R. Rivest et al., A Method for ObtainingDigital Signatures
and Public Key Cryptosystems, 21 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 120 (1978).
35. "Highly specialized," in this context, means the lack of widespread use of the
technology, coupled with the lack of interoperable systems and protocols. Early cryptographic
systems usually were unique for each application, both in terms of physical implementation and
the algorithms utilized.
86. SeeFroomkin, supra note 4, at 890 (discussing disadvantages to secret key cryptography).
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securely. Implementation of such a system involves distributing those
keys to all parties and updating the keys on a frequent basis. At least
two drawbacks exist in a secret key system. First, compromise of the
secret key by one user compromises the entire communications
network for all users.3 7 Second, numerous opportunities exist for a
compromise to occur in a secret key system.38 Because the secret key
must be handled by more than one person in a key distribution
system, the danger exists that compromise could occur at any point.
Unlike secret key cryptography, public key cryptography involves a
system of mathematically related information known as a pub-
lic/private key pair. The key pair enables a user to publicly distribute
a piece of information (the public key), which then can be used by
others to communicate securely with that user. 9 The user retains
the private key, preferably in a hardware token. This approach
alleviates the need for all users in a system to have the same secret key
in advance. Instead, each user simply posts his or her public key
where other users can access it.'
The cryptographic basis of a public key cryptosystem addresses both
drawbacks cited above that exist in secret key cryptosystems. First,
because each user has a different public/private key pair, a compro-
mise would not affect the entire system. Also, most competent
implementations of public key cryptography never allow the secret key
to leave the cryptographic token.4 Further, the secret key usually
is well protected.42 Thus, the likelihood of a disclosure of the
private key is minimized.
C. What Is a Digital Signature?
The concepts underlying public key cryptography manifest
themselves in digital signatures as well as in encryption and
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See SCHNEIER, supra note 4, at 31-32; Froomkin, supra note 4, at 891.
40. The posting of a public key is somewhat analogous to publishing a phone number in
the telephone book. In the not-so-distant future, the process of looking up someone's e-mail
address in a public directory of information will become a common occurrence. From this
directory, the person's certificate could be retrieved, enabling the retrieving party to
communicate securely with the person whose identity is bound to that public key. The
Consultative Committee on International Telephone and Telegraph ("CCrIT") has
recommended one such system, known as X.500.
41. A "cryptographic token" is a broad term for the physical medium that carries the
cryptographic key. For example, two of the most common and most promising personal
cryptographic tokens are the PCMCIA card and the smart card.
42. See SCHNEIER, supra note 4, at 32 (observing that private key cannot be deduced from
public key).
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decryption. 3 The structure of a public/private key pair also exists
in a digital signature scheme.44 Whereas encryption uses the public
key to encrypt and the private key to decrypt the data, however, a
digital signature scheme based on public key cryptographic techniques
utilizes the private key to sign the message.45 Correspondingly, the
public key verifies the digital signature.46 Thus, in an encryption
scheme, anyone can secure data that is to be sent to the recipient, but
only the recipient can decrypt because only the recipient possesses the
secret key. Similarly, in a digital signature scheme, only the signer
can produce the digital signature because only the signer has the
secret key. Because the public key is publicly available, however,
anyone having access to that public key can verify the signature.47
Several publications discuss digital signatures, but few provide an
example. What follows is a sample message with a cryptographically-
based digital signature attached:
-BEGIN SIGNED MESSAGE-
ACME DIGITAL PRODUCTS, INC.
Purchase order number: 4789
Date: Dec. 21, 1996
This message represents a valid purchase order for: 1000 widgets at
the quoted price of: $100/each from vendor: VENDOR ONE
Terms: Net 30
-END SIGNED MESSAGE-
Public Key ID # F3CA9C473B06




Comment: VENDOR ONE Purchase Order
43. See id at 37-41 (discussing process of using public key algorithms for digital signatures
and encryption).
44. See id at 39 (describing act of signing by use of digital signature algorithms as
"encrypting with a private key" and verifying the signature as "decrypting with a public key").
45. See &.
46. See id.
47. See Froomkin, supra note 4, at 895 n.798 (illustrating that anyone with sender's public
key can decrypt digitally signed message and can be reasonably certain it was not sent under
fraudulent circumstances because only sender, in possession of private key, could have encrypted
the message).





Due to the mathematical basis of public key cryptography, a digital
signature is simply a stream of digits that appears unintelligible to the
human observer; however, it actually possesses a significant amount of
information. In commercial implementations, the digital signature
probably would not be displayed to the user. Instead, upon the
successful verification of the signature, the communication mecha-
nism would provide an indication that the verification of the digital
signature was successful and display the identity of the signer. This
information would be made available as a result of the certificate used
to verify the signature.
A digital signature utilizes sophisticated and elegant mathematical
techniques to provide security services that are critical to international
EC and EDI. First, and most importantly for EC and EDI, a digital
signature provides authentication. Authentication assures the
recipient of a verified digital signature that only the sender could
have created the message to which the digital signature was ap-
plied.4" Authentication is analogous to a handwritten signature on
a document, hence the "digital signature" appellation.4 9 Due to the
binding between each signed message and the signer, however, a
digital signature actually provides even stronger authentication than
a handwritten signature. Whereas a paper-based signature exists on
and authenticates only the last page (or, at best, each page, if in fact
each page is initialed), a digital signature effectively provides
authentication of every bit that makes up every character within the
message. One might view a digital signature as an application of
one's initials to each and every letter that constitutes the message. °
This means that unlike a handwritten signature, digital signatures
differ for each and every message that a user sends.5
48. See id. (discussing verification advantages in public key digital signatures).
49. Handwritten signatures are, in theory, authentic, unforgeable, non-reusable, unalterable,
and cannot be repudiated. See SCHNEIER, supra note 4, at 35. Digital signatures created by
public-key algorithms provide the same characteristics as handwritten signatures. See id. at 37-38.
50. See Froomkin, supra note 4, at 895 (noting that message that has been digitally signed
by private key will not decrypt properly if it has been altered even slightly).
51. See id. (explaining that message that has been digitally signed by private key will not
decrypt properly if signature was forged by copying it from different message).
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Next, a digital signature provides nonrepudiation. This assures the
recipient of a message verified with a digital signature that the sender
later cannot deny having sent the message. Were this to occur, the
recipient could prove the authorship of the message by using the
sender's public key in combination with the received message. In
verifying the digital signature using the sender's public key, the
recipient would have the proof that only the holder of the corre-
sponding private key could have created the original message.
Although closely related to the concept of authentication,
nonrepudiation is conceptually distinguishable. Whereas authentica-
tion provides assurance only of the origin of the message,
nonrepudiation assures that the sender of the message cannot deny
sending the message.
Finally, most common digital signature algorithms provide integrity
via a mechanism known as a hash function. 2 A hash function
reduces a set of bits of arbitrary length to a fixed length known as a
hash result (or simply a hash)." In doing so, a hash function must
possess three important characteristics. First, it must be
computationally infeasible to derive another meaningful message that
would result in the same hash value.54 This means that someone
52. A hash function provides a means by which a message of arbitrary length can be
reduced to a generally smaller, fixed-length value, and by which it can be consistently computed
for a given set of information. As an example, a simple, non-cryptographic (and weak) hash
function might involve simply adding the ordered values for each character in a message and
ignoring any carries past two digits. Thus, 'A' or 'a' would have a value of 1, 'B' or 'b' would
have a value of 2, etc. In this example, we might define a space as having a value of 27, a
comma as having a value of 28, and a period as having a value of 29. Given the following
message:
This is a sample message.
the hash value would be equal to 357. This was computed by adding up T=20, h=8, i=9, s=19,
space=27, etc., for the entire message.
In order to provide integrity, the sender would calculate a hash value for a message, and
would use that value to calculate the digital signature. The recipient would calculate a hash
value for the received message and would use that hash value to verify the signature. Using the
example above, if the message had been changed (either innocently or maliciously) to:
This is a simple message.
the hash value would be equal to 365. The mismatch in values, which would result in an error
when trying to verify the digital signature, would be an indication that the integrity of the
message had been compromised.
Note that the simplicity of this hash function (which actually is a simple checksum) is
intended to illustrate how such a function works. In actual practice, this hash function would
not be adequate because its simplicity would allow the relatively easy computation of a message
with an identical hash value. Instead, secure hash functions are one-way cryptographic
transformations that cannot be reversed. See SCHNEIER, supra note 4, at 30.
53. The term "hash result" also commonly appears in information security literature as a
"message digest." See id. at 353, 435-36 (explaining operation of message digest in detail).
54. See DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR CERTIFICATION
AUTHORIIES AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 36 (Info. Sec. Comm., Elec. Com. & Info. Tech. Div.,
A.BA Sci. & Tech. Sec. 1996) [hereinafter DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES].
SIGNING ON THE DIGITAL DOTTED LINE
cannot purposely create a message that makes sense and that also will
yield a hash value identical to one for a different message that also
makes sense. 5 Second, it must be computationally infeasible to
derive the original message from the hash value.56 This means that
the message corresponding to a given hash value should not be
determinable only by knowledge of the hash value. For example,
given a hash value of hash1, the underlying message (msgl) could not
be determined. Finally, the hash result should be identical for a given
algorithm and a given input.5' This means that regardless of the
implementation, identical hash results will occur for a given message
and algorithm. In other words, for a message (msgl), the chosen
hash function will yield the same hash value (hash1) every time for
that message.
D. How Digital Signatures Work
Handwritten signatures traditionally have served several legal
purposes. For example, a written signature can be used as evi-
dence,58 as a ceremonial function, as a designation of approval, 9
and as a determination of authenticity.6" A digital signature can
fulfill all of these purposes without changing the existing paradigm of
a person "signing" a document. The digital signature exchange
involves two parties directly. At the sending end, the signer creates
a message and then uses a cryptographic processing package to
produce the digital signature.6' The signer uses the private key of
55. In mathematical terms, this would mean that the hash ofa meaningful message (msgl),
which yields a hash of hashl, could not also result when a second meaningful (but different)






hashl & hash2 when msgl msg2
for a given hashing algorithm.
56. See DIGrrAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 54, at 36.
57. See id.
58. See Stanley A. Kurzban, Authentication of Computer-generated Evidence in the United States
Federal Courts, 35 IDEA 437, 459 (1995) (arguing that rules for authenticating computer-
generated signatures used as evidence are based on use of hand-written signatures as evidence).
59. See DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDEINES, supra note 54, at 4.
60. SeeJudith Y. Gliniecki & Ceda G. Ogada, The Legal Acceptance of Electronic Documents,
Writings, Signatures, and Notices in International Transportation Conventions: A Challenge in the Age
of Global Electronic Commerce, 13 Nw.J. INT'L L. & BUs. 117, 134 (1992).
61. A cryptographic processing package may be hardware-based, software-based, or some
combination of the two. For example, a digital signature might be calculated using a software
program running on a computer. The digital signature also might be calculated within a
hardware token such as a smart card or PC card. There are advantages and disadvantages to
both methods. The use of a hardware token provides the strongest security because the private
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the public/private key pair to generate the digital signature on the
message and then binds the digital signature to the message. At the
receiving end, the recipient uses the signer's public key to verify the
digital signature.
E. Public Key Infrastructure
For all of this sophisticated and elegant mathematical processing to
be implemented properly, a segment of the informational infrastruc-
ture must serve to certify the validity of a particular holder of a
public/private key.62 The prevailing validation model consists of a
hierarchy of entities, commonly known as certification authorities
("CA"), that provide a level of trust to a public key infrastructure.63
A CA is a licensed third party' which validates the digital signatures
of authors or other subscribers to its service.65 One area of continu-
ing legal evolution concerns the allocation of liability within this type
of system.
66
At the heart of a public key infrastructure is the notion of a
certificate. A certificate contains a user's name and public key.'
Thus, a certificate links the identity of the holder of the private key
to a corresponding public key. From a legal standpoint, the CA and
the subscriber share in the liability associated with the digital
signature mechanism. 9 By certifying the subscriber's certificate, the
CA states that the subscriber has satisfied the requirements specified
by the CA.70
key never leaves the confines of the token. Hardware tokens, however, tend to be slightly more
expensive than a software package. In contrast, a software package might be somewhat less
expensive but provides much less security because the private key resides in the untrusted host
computer.
62. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Access to the National Information Infrastructure, 30 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 51, 99-100 (1995).
63. See SCHNEIER, supra note 4, at 186 (discussing role of certification authorities).
64. It is expected that each state will license their CAs. See infra note 138.
65. See SCHNEIER, supra note 4, at 186.
66. See generally MICHAEL BAUM, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. FEDERAL CERTIFICATION
AUTHORITY LIABILITY AND POLICY: LAw AND POLICY OF CERTIFICATE-BASED PUBLIC KEY AND
DIGITAL SIGNATURES (1994) (providing thorough treatment of issues involving certification
authorities).
67. See SCHNEIER, supra note 4, at 426; see also Charles R. Merrill, What Lawyers Need to Know
About the Internet, in A CRYPTOGRAPHY PRIMER 187, 192 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Prop. Course Handbook Order No. 443, 1996) (noting importance of certification
authorities to public key cryptography system).
68. See Merrill, supra note 67, at 193.
69. Cf id. at 194 (discussing electronic commerce model using single central figure to
interact with many subscribers without certificate authority liability).
70. For example, a CA with minimal certification requirements might require a subscriber
to fill out a form. At another level, the CA might require the subscriber to fill out a form and
provide proof of identity, perhaps via a driver's license or passport. For each possible scenario,
the associated liabilities would be analogous to the requirements. In the first example above,
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II. OPEN SYSTEMS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE,
AND ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE
The computer revolution of the 1980s forever altered the business
landscape by changing the manner by which information is transmit-
ted and consumed. It soon became apparent that the potential for
this new technology would be limited only by the imagination of those
with the vision to apply it to a myriad of life's situations. More
importantly, it became evident that the repercussions of this informa-
tion revolution would far exceed the effects of the transition from
handwriting to mechanical printing.7' The computer has become an
electronic version of Gutenberg's printing press, with an even greater
impact on society.
Although the expectations and realities of the Internet do not
necessarily coincide, they continue to converge. Whether the
Internet's global information infrastructure eventually will replace a
majority of current business channels remains the topic of much
debate.72 Numerous obstacles exist, even when limiting the scope to
a national view. At the international level, further impediments to the
pervasive use of technology among nations persist. International EC
and EDI can become a successful reality only when these obstacles
have been addressed in such a way that businesses feel secure in
employing the technology.
In order for this revolution to occur, a legal framework must be
erected that will delineate the rights, responsibilities, and liabilities of
the CA might waive all liability with regard to the proper identity of the subscriber. In the
second scenario, the CA might accept some limited liability for any problem associated with the
identity of the subscriber.
71. Some effects include:
(1) The ability to access instantly an enormous amount of information. Prior to the
computer, one was limited by the physical availability of the desired written resources. Now, a
single electronic connection can provide a great wealth of information.
(2) The ability to instantly process information. Prior to the computer, significant effort
needed to be spent on relatively time-consuming and repetitive tasks. Now, electronic
spreadsheets, databases, and word processors (to name just a few of the commercial
applications) have made numerous tasks much easier and faster. Consequently, more time can
be spent on more substantive work.
(3) The relative ease with which communications can occur among people in very diverse
cultures.
72. See Christine Curtis, EDI over the Internet: Let the Games Begin, COMM. WK., Sept. 9, 1996,
at 59 (contending that more corporations will engage in electronic data interchange on Internet
as costs decrease and security improves); Art Hutchinson, Pushing the Envelope: Vendors Ready for
War over Securing Content Control and Distribution, COMM. WK., Sept. 2, 1996, at 508 (noting that
developing software technologies will enable many business functions to take place on Internet).
But seeJim Sabo, Riding Shotgun on the Electronic Stagecoach, NET GUIDE, Aug. 1, 1996, at 119
(warning that lack of security on the Internet may dissuade businesses from expanding into
electronic commerce).
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the various parties involved. International electronic transactions will
not occur on a vast scale unless the law provides adequate clarity with
respect to EC and EDT.
Numerous interpretations exist about the precise meaning of the
commonly heard terms "electronic commerce" and "electronic data
interchange." For example, one definition describes EDI as a "service
by which corporations can send payments and invoices electronically
to trading partners via banks.""3 Another definition focuses on the
facilitation of exchanging electronic information via the combination
of computers and telecommunications systems.7 4 According to one
definition, EC involves the electronic transfer of funds in commercial
transactions.7' For the purposes of this discussion, EC means any
transaction involving an electronic analog for one of the traditionally
"paper-based" elements of a commercial transaction.
III. BARRIERS TO INTERNATIONAL EC/EDI TRANSACTIONS
The growth of open electronic systems has matured to the point at
which one naturally would expect international electronic transactions
to be commonplace.7 6  Based on other examples of modernization
that have been adapted for use in international transactions, such as
fax machines, the next logical progression would involve pervasive
global electronic transactions." However, several factors contribute
to the relative rarity of international EC and EDI systems.78 Barriers
to this evolution must continue to be examined, and accommodations
must be made so that the introduction of electronic business systems
become the norm rather than the exception.
Existing business and legal infrastructures embrace a technology
that had its beginnings more than 500 years ago. The reliance on
paper-based systems presents a formidable barrier to the adoption of
73. Brian O'Keefe, Automated Clearing House Growth in an International Marketplace: The
Increased Flexibility of Electronic Funds Transfer and Its Impact on the Minimum Contacts Test; 15 U. PA.
J. INT'L Bus. L. 105, 114 (1994).
74. SeeJeffrey B. Ritter, Current Issues in Electronic Data Interchange: Defining International
Electronic Commerce, 13 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 3, 17-20 (1992).
75. See George A. Zaphiriou, Unification and Harmonization of Law Relating to Global and
Regional Trading, 14 N. ILL U. L. REv. 407, 413 (1994).
76. SeeJames Gleick, Dead as a Dollar, N.Y. TIME, June 16, 1996, § 6 (Magazine), at 27-29
(describing decline of cash use and increase of electronic transfers of funds).
77. See id. at 29-30 (discussing experiments by financial and telecommunication companies
that envision global electronic transactions).
78. See BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: EDI, E-MAIL, AND
INTERNET: TECHNOLOGY, PROOF, AND LIABILrIY §§ 4.3, 7.3, 10.1, 13.4 (2d ed. 1995) (offering
exhaustive treatment of existing barriers to electronic commerce including risks associated with
novelty of field, unsettled law, and skeptical courts and range of problems from best evidence
rule to Internet security).
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electronic means of conducting business. 9 Nonetheless, once the
international business community better understands the close
analogies between traditional, paper-based security mechanisms and
electronic technologies, it will embrace the technology 0 The
foothold of existing paper-based systems eventually will be replaced by
globally accepted electronic means. To facilitate this transition,
harmonization of both legal and technical perspectives must occur.
In many instances, domestic and international law formalities
overfly or implicitly restrict business transactions to paper-based
systems. The commercial world long has relied on paper docu-
ments."1 As a result of this dependence, the paper requirement in
commercial transactions significantly limits the acceleration of
electronic commerce. 2 Further, formal requirements that differ
among international parties could handicap EC and EDI to the point
at which the technology offers little advantage over existing paper-
based systems. 3 Requirements for documents, writings, and notice
contribute to this particular barrier.
84
Traditional letter of credit ("LOG") transactions exemplify the
paper documentation paradigm in international transactions. These
transactions consist of "the LOC itself, the draft, and all of the various
shipping and insurance documents that frequently accompany the
draft" 5 and traditionally have been "awash in paper documenta-
tion."8 6 Manually processing this paperwork unnecessarily inflates
the cost of these transactions. Accelerating the use of EC and EDI in
this area would reduce significantly, and perhaps even eliminate, the
associated costs.
87
79. Cf Udo Flohr, Electric Money, BYTE, June 1996, at 74-76 (noting that consumers and
merchants perceive bills and coins as having real value, unlike "electric money").
80. See id. at 76 (describing efficiency rewards of having underlying financial networks that
are "open, scalable, and able to interweave consumers with retailers, material suppliers, and
financial institutions").
81. SeeR. David Whitaker, Letters of Credit and Electronic Commerce, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 699, 700
(1995).
82. See Jeffrey B. Ritter & Judith Y. Gliniecki, International Electronic Commerce and
Administrative Law: The Need for Harmonized National Reform, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 263, 264
(1993) (describing how current legal structures in statutory and regulatory areas validate
enforceability of commercial transactions via paper media).
83. See Gliniecki & Ogada, supra note 60, at 132.
84. See id.
85. Whitaker, supra note 81, at 700.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 706-07 (introducing alternative to existing paper-based letter of credit
practice). Professor Whitaker describes an automated letter of credit transaction. See id. Within
this model, he alludes to the need for a low-level method of authentication. See id. A digital
signature would be the ideal method to meet this need.
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One well-known anecdote describes another situation in which
significant cost savings could result from the use of EC and EDI. An
average ship carries 500 pounds or more of paperwork related to the
cargo on board."8 All the information contained within those
documents, if reduced to a common format, easily could be stored
electronically. Electronic storage not only would free space and
reduce weight, but it also would facilitate rapid transferal of the
information once the goods were delivered. 9
In addition to the limitations regarding legal requirements for
paper documents, the requirements for a handwritten signature
provide an even more significant limitation. The signature require-
ment "may be the single greatest obstacle to electronic commerce."9"
Although progress has been made in reducing the limitations of
handwritten signature requirements in the four years since that
statement was made, the handwritten signature remains a significant
impediment.91
At a recent conference,92 one presenter provided a poignant
example of the commercial world's unwillingness to abandon the
handwritten signature. CygnaCom Solutions, Inc., provides a
paperless mortgage processing system to Chemical Bank.9" The
system provides a hierarchy of trust, via an issuer, custodian, and
releaser.94 Both the issuer and the custodian apply their respective
digital signatures to the mortgage pool information.95 The releaser
verifies the two digital signatures and archives the transaction. 6 The
irony within the system is the inclusion of a digitized signature
97 of
both the issuer and the custodian. Thus, a system exists that embeds
a handwritten signature within a packet of data that has a digital
88. See Ritter, supra note 74, at 17.
89. See id.
90. Gliniecki & Ogada, supra note 60, at 134-35.
91. See, e.g., Ritter & Gliniecki, supra note 82, at 269 (noting that although commercial
practice and rules develop around barriers ofmanual signatures, "only positive regulatory reform
will transform these administrative requirements into a media-neutral environment that
facilitates the evolution of electronic commerce").
92. RSA Day in Washington, D.C., Apr. 25, 1996.
93. See Santosh Chokhani, BSAFE and Banking Security (Apr. 25, 1995) (written materials




97. The reader should be carefuil to note the difference between a "digitized signature" and
a digital signature. A digitized signature is simply an electronic representation of a handwritten
signature. The electronic form of a handwritten signature can be produced using a scanner or
other electronic means. There is no cryptographic basis to this method, however, and the
digitized signature offers none of the additional security services provided by the mathematics
of a digital signature (e.g., data integrity, nonrepudiation, and authentication).
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signature applied to it.9" Although the use of digital signature
technology in this system is laudable, the retention of the handwritten
signature provides an ideal example of the adherence to prior
formalities.
Another barrier involves the slow rate of reaction by the law to
technological advances. In one particular domestic example, a task
force working on Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C.") commented that technological developments "not envi-
sioned by the drafters of Article 2... test the capacity of the Code to
keep pace with business developments."99 In contrast to the develop-
ment of the law, the growth of technology continues to accelerate at
an incredible pace."° Thus, the interpretation of existing law and
the development of new law must occur in such a way that business
is encouraged to rely on new technologies. When governmental
regulation operates, the mandates should focus on functional areas
instead of technical issues.' 0'
IV. EFFORTS TO DATE
Some commentators suggest that harmonization between commer-
cial practice and international law is necessary to facilitate the
widespread acceptance of EC and EDI.102 To determine a path
forward, existing efforts first must be analyzed to identify barriers that
have been overcome and those that remain.
The general areas where advances have occurred fall into the
following two categories: transactional functions and notarial
functions. Transactional functions involve those that occur between
two parties in various types of business arrangements. Notarial
functions involve attestation of documents and administration of
oaths. The examples that follow illustrate where progress has been
made in these two areas.
98. See Chokhani, supra note 93.
99. Roy R. Anderson et al., An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the Uniform
Commercial Code Article 2 Study Group, 16 DELJ. CoRP. L. 981, 1038 (1991).
100. One measure of such growth, known as Moore's Law, postulates that the number of
transistors that can be placed on a single computer chip will double every two years. This theory
has held true since Gordon Moore, one of the co-founders of Intel Corp., first predicted the
trend more than 20 years ago. See Robert Lenzner, The Reluctant Entrepreneur, FORBES, Sept. 11,
1995, at 162.
101. See Perritt, supra note 62, at 98.
102. See Gliniecki & Ogada, supra note 60, at 118.
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A. Transactional Functions
One type of transactional function on which progress has been
made in the EDI area involves credit transfers. The United States
already has enacted Article 4A of the U.C.C. to cover these transac-
tions. Internationally, the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") has adopted a model law covering
credit transfers. 3 According to UNCITRAL's web page:
[The Model Law,] adopted in 1992, deals with operations begin-
ning with an instruction by an originator to a bank to place at the
disposal of a beneficiary a specified amount of money. It covers
such matters as the obligations of a sender of the instruction and
of a receiving bank, time of payment of a receiving bank and
liability of a bank to its sender or to the originator when the
transfer is delayed or other error occurs.'
04
This description, and the detail found in the language of the model
law, clearly indicates the desire by UNCITRAL to provide guidance in
the low-level, detailed areas of EC that businesses need to make their
decisions. Unlike high-level harmonizing language, which merely
reduces barriers but does not provide detailed solutions, model laws
provide the necessary details to facilitate the acceptance of electronic
transactions.
UNCITRAL also has made progress with regard to the international
repercussions of EDI. It recently produced a Draft Model Law on
Legal Aspects of Electronic Data Interchange and Related Means of
Communication ("Model Law") . The Model Law "applies to any
kind of information in the form of a data message used in the context
of commercial activities."
0 6
Another transactional area implicating international EC involves a
system similar to the domestic Automated Clearing House ("ACH")
mechanism. An ACH system electronically facilitates the process of
clearing checks. Essentially, it is "the electronic equivalent [of] the
paper check processing system."0 7 Recognizing the utility of such
a system, and the benefits that it would provide on an international
scale, the European Commission has been examining the utility of a
103. See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on Int'l Credit Transfers International Trade (visited
Nov. 16, 1996) <http://ra.irv.uit.no/trade law/financecredit.transfers/uncitral-ml/txt/m.int.
credit-trans.complete.html> (on file with The American University Law Review).
104. See id.
105. Report of the UN. Commission on International Trade Law, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp.
No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/50/17 (1995).
106. Id. at 41.
107. O'Keefe, supra note 73, at 105.
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super-ACH system.' Such a system, if it were to develop, would
require a significant amount of international cooperation due to the
differences in the banking systems of the various parties involved.109
Once established, a super-AGH system would simplify international
transactions.
The hindrances to internationalization of the system are readily
discernible even with regard to extending the U.S. ACH system to
include Canada. Although the technology might exist to complete
ACH transactions between the two North American neighbors,
problems such as float periods, standards, settlement, and risk
management remain unresolved."' Nevertheless, the benefits that
would accrue from such a system make investigation of the possible
implementation of a U.S.-Canadian ACH system worthwhile.
In response to the absence of clear legal guidance regarding EC
and EDI, the Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, under the
auspices of the American Bar Association, began a study in 1987 to
"examine the effects of electronic commerce upon fundamental
principles of contract law and related legal issues.""' As a result of
the study, the group undertook further work that led to the develop-
ment of a Model Electronic Data Interchange Trading Partner
Agreement and Commentary ("Model TPA"), which contains
provisions covering electronic exchange of transactional business
information." 2  The Model TPA provides a framework by which
EDI, "in substitution for conventional paper-based documents," can
be used to facilitate transactions."
3
Of particular note in the Model TPA is its treatment of signa-
tures."' Although still requiring a signature, the Model TPA affords
to the parties considerable flexibility in defining what will be accept-
able." 5 It also specifically notes that existing technology, sophistica-
tion of the parties, and applicable standards must be taken into
consideration when deciding which signature technology to use.
16
One criticism of the Model TPA approach to facilitating EDI
centers on its perceived limitations. The argument essentially claims
that the endorsement by the business and legal communities of
108. See id. at 106.
109. See id. at 112-13.
110. See id.at 114.
111. Michael S. Baum et aL., Model Electronic Data Interchange Trading Partner Agreement and
Commentary, 45 Bus. LAW. 1645, 1718 (1990).
112. See id. at 1719.
113. See id. at 1721.
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trading partner agreements as private rule-making processes imposes
limitations that actually run counter to an open system EC/EDI."7
Such private agreements, however, promote the growth of EC and
EDI by fostering the use of electronic mechanisms."' Although the
particular approach chosen by trading partners ultimately might prove
to be different than the approach that the business world adopts as
a standard, those entities who pioneer EC and EDI methodologies will
excel."' Therefore, the use of TPAs should not be curtailed.
Other examples of progress in the transactional area include the
following: (1) the adoption of the Uniform Rules of Conduct for
Interchange of Trade Data by Teletransmission ("UNCID") by the
International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") in 1987;12 ° (2) the
development by a United Nations working group of a standard format
for international EDI messages known as the Electronic Data Inter-
change for Administration, Commerce, and Transport
("UN/EDIFACT");12 ' and (3) the adoption by the European
Community of the Trade Electronic Data Interchange Systems
("TEDIS") program. 22  In addition, one recent proposal would
extend the use of EDI to fungible agricultural goods.
123
B. Notarial Functions
Another significant international legal area affected by advances in
technology consists of notarial functions. In the international
context, the concept of a notary goes far beyond the American notion
of a notary public. A notary in the United States refers to the
common-law concept of a public officer authorized to administer
oaths, take acknowledgment of deeds, and attest to the authenticity
of a person's signature. 124  In contrast, a notary in most foreign
jurisdictions refers to the civil-law concept of a legal professional who
provides a corresponding higher level of authentication and certifica-
tion in numerous transactions." A civil-law notary, such as those
117. See Ritter & Gliniecki, supra note 82, at 266.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 266-67.
120. Uniform Rules of Conduct for Interchange of Trade Data by Teletransmission ("UNCID"),
International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Doc. 452 (1988).
121. See Amelia H. Boss, The International Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange and
Electronic Communications Technologies, 46 BUS. LAW. 1787, 1796 (1991).
122. See id. at 1793.
123. See Donald B. Pedersen, Electronic Data Interchange as Documents of Title for Fungible
Agricultural Commodities, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 719, 720-21 (1995).
124. See BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (6th ed. 1990).
125. See Theodore S. Barassi, The Cybernotaty: Public Key Registration and Certication and
Authentication of International Legal Transactions (visited Sept. 23, 1996)
<http://www.intermarket'com/ecl/cybrnote.htnl> (on file with The American University Law
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in Europe and Latin America, undergo demanding training and
testing in addition to being lawyers. 6
The United States Council for International Business has advanced
the notion of a "Cybernotary" to more closely align the United States
with international notarial practice.2 7 This group seeks to establish
the Cybernotary as a recognized legal entity.2 8 A Cybernotary
would be a lawyer well versed in international business, EC, EDI, and
information security. 1 9 In particular, lawyers in this capacity must
be proficient in digital signature technology3 ' because a significant
portion of their duties will involve authentication of electronic
documents.
V. A PROPOSED PATH FORWARD: INCREMENTAL TECHNICAL AND
LEGAL HARMONIZATION BEGINNING WITH THE SPECIFIC AREA OF
DIGITAL SIGNATURES
Notwithstanding the barriers to global electronic transactions, the
foregoing examples of progress toward international harmonization
in electronic transactions provide a good starting point. Existing legal
barriers that inhibit or prevent electronic transactions gradually will
be eliminated. Without further legal guidance regarding specific
electronic mechanisms such as digital signatures, however, these
efforts will be of limited value.
Each of the transactions described above would require some sort
of authentication. A harmonized model law or set of guidelines on
digital signatures would apply in all of the areas cited as examples.
Thus, for technology to be used to its fullest potential, progress also
must be made at the low levels, where the details of the law need
further definition."' In particular, the low-level details of interna-
tional EC and EDI must be clarified in order for electronic transac-
tions to be implemented widely and used effectively.
A cryptographically strong-and industry and academically
proven-method of authentication, digital signature technology
should be afforded international legal recognition as a means for
Rei).
126. See id.
127. See Kathleen Murphy, Cyber-Cartification (visited Sept. 23, 1996) <http://




130. See Victoria Slind-Flow, Moving into Cyberspace as Notaries: Legal Locksmiths, NAT'L LJ.,
Dec. 18, 1995, at Al.
131. See Peter Seipel, The Technology of Insight: Computers and Informed Citizens, 69 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 417, 418 (1993).
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satisfying existing signature requirements. To further this goal, a
common set of rules or guidelines addressing digital signatures should
be developed. An international set of rules would provide a strong
.legal and technical basis for further harmonization. International
guidelines would allow lawmakers to understand better the interaction
of the legal and technical aspects of this useful mechanism. Further-
more, such guidelines would be widely applicable because signature
requirements will continue to exist.
The technology of digital signatures provides stronger assurances of
security than those provided by handwritten signatures. Digital
signatures not only assure the recipient that the sender actually sent
the message, but they also ensure the integrity of the data and
guarantee nonrepudiation.'32 As a result, a digital signature on an
electronic document can serve as an ideal foundation on which to
build an internationally harmonized EC and EDI framework.
A. Technical and Legal Issues Must Be Addressed Together
Global acceptance of digital transactions can be accomplished only
through a combination of both technical and legal efforts. On the
technical side, technologists must consider the international repercus-
sions of the systems that they design and field. Keeping abreast of the
international systems that exist and of those that are being designed,
information security professionals must strive to develop systems that
will transcend national boundaries and provide capabilities that will
withstand the rigors of the law.
On the legal side, the introduction of internationally acceptable
rules and guidelines provides an impetus for companies to use the
technology. Without such legal guidance, the commercial community
likely would be unwilling to embrace the technology. A parallel can
be drawn to the rulemaking that occurred in the United States in
response to the electronic trading of corporate securities.' 3 With-
out rules to address this new activity, no means existed by which
disputes could be resolved."M As a result, Article 8 of the U.C.C.
132. See supra Part IA (describing security services offered by digital signatures).
133. See Ritter & Gliniecki, supra note 82, at 271 n.20 (citing Charles.W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond
Neutraliy: A New Modelfor Transfer and Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12
C.a6ozo L. REv. 305 (1990)). Professor Mooney examines the use of traditional property law
constructs in resolving claims to fungible bulks of securities. Professor Mooney argues that a
new model focusing on the relationship of the claimants to the intermediaries would better
serve the purpose of the claims. See id. at 271.
134. See id. at 271 n.20.
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provides rules covering the transfer of legal rights without the
exchange of paper stock certificates.
135
B. United States as Leader
As a technology leader, the United States should take an active role
in furthering international harmonization efforts involving technology.
Several domestic efforts already underway could and should be
adapted to an international setting. For example, the Information
Security Committee of the Section of Science and Technology of the
American Bar Association has produced a set of Digital Signature
Guidelines." 6 These guidelines provide a technically and legally
sound framework by which consistent legislation can be modeled,
both domestically and internationally. Thus, the guidelines exemplify
the type of model document that would serve well the objectives
outlined above.
At the domestic level, several states either have enacted digital
signature legislation or are considering bills." 7 Although those
implementing legislation must avoid introducing new barriers,'38 the
initiative of these progressive states to address this technology
represents a major step forward in the proliferation of EC and EDI.
CONCLUSION
The international business world stands poised to embrace currently
available EC and EDI technology in order to increase efficiency and
to reduce cost. To facilitate the acceptance of these technologies,
135. See U.C.C. § 8-102(6) (1996) ("'Communicate' means to: (i) send a signed writing, or
(ii) transmit information by any mechanism agreed upon by the persons transmitting and
receiving the information.").
136. See DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 54.
137. The following states have passed legislation regarding digital signatures or have such
legislation pending: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-121 (1996); California, CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 16.5 (West 1996); Florida, Electronic Signature Act of 1996, 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 224; Georgia,
H.R. 1256, 143d Leg., 96th Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1996) (creating House Digital Signatures Study
Committee to examine need for legislation addressing authentication of electronic messages);
Hawaii, H.R. 3759, 18th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1996) (introducing Hawaii Digital Signature Act);
S. 2401, 18th Leg., Reg. Seas. (Haw. 1996) (establishing pilot program in which state agency acts
as certification authority to verify digital signatures of attorneys, notaries, and other persons
authorized to use such signatures on electronic documents); Illinois, H.R. 3394,89th Leg., Reg.
Ses. (I1. 1996) (authorizing use of digital signatures with electronic communications between
state agencies and comptroller); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3 (1996); Virginia, H.R. 822, Reg.
Seas. (Va. 1996) (introducing Virginia Digital Signature Act); and Washington, Electronic
Authentication Act, ch. 250, 1996 Wash. Laws 1190.
138. For example, if a state were to introduce legislation with significant licensure
requirements, it might present too formidable of an entry barrier to companies considering
entering the business. Similarly, if a number of states implement legislation with significantly
different licensure requirements, the difficulty of obtaining a license in all of these states might
present another entry barrier.
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international harmonization must occur at all levels. Existing high-
level barriers must be eliminated, and corresponding detailed
rulemaking must occur. Approaches at low levels with wide accep-
tance also should be sought to provide a solid foundation upon which
further progress may be made.
One ideal candidate for progress at the low level involves digital
signature technology based on public key cryptographic techniques.
The widespread use of this technology in the area of international
business will lead to more efficient and more cost-effective transac-
tions. Because public key technology in general, and digital signature
technology in particular, has matured significantly, now is an ideal
time to elevate the technology to a level of legal acceptability, both
domestically and internationally. With domestic efforts underway,
international acceptance should be the next logical step.
